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price cap or capacity payment a¤ects investment only in peak generation plant, with
no equilibrium impact on baseload or mid-merit plant. We obtain a rationale for
a capacity mechanism based on the internalization of a system-cost externality
even where the price cap is set at the value of lost load. In extensions, we show
how increasing renewables penetration enhances the need for a capacity mechanism,
and outline an optimal design of a strategic reserve with a discriminatory capacity
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1 Introduction
Capacity mechanisms are playing a growing role in electricity market design. In a nutshell,
they award generators a capacity payment in exchange for being available to supply at
a specied date. Capacity markets, in which this payment is determined by auction, are
long-standing feature in several regional US power systems (such as ISO New England
and PJM) and have in recent years been introduced in Great Britain, France, and Ireland.
In 2018, the European Commission approved new market-wide capacity auctions in Italy
and Poland as well as strategic reserves in Belgium and Germany.
There are a variety of justications for a capacity mechanism. Its rationale is often said
to arise from the presence of a price cap in the wholesale market. On one hand, a price cap
protects electricity consumers from too highprices (perhaps resulting from the exercise
of market power). On the other hand, setting it too low leads to underinvestment
known as the missing money problem(e.g., Joskow 2008). To this is added that greater
renewables penetration reduces the running hours of conventional plant via the much-
discussed merit-order e¤ect. A capacity mechanism, by providing generators with an
additional revenue stream, has the potential to resolve the missing-money problem.
At the same time, the use and design of capacity mechanisms remains hotly debated.
Some jurisdictions, such as Texas, rely on an energy-onlymarket design without ap-
parent need for capacity payments, some jurisdictions rely on a capacity auction and yet
others use a strategic reserve to guarantee security of supply. Despite the recent prolif-
eration of national capacity mechanisms, the European Commission has arguably taken
a sceptical view due to concerns about market fragmentation and potential distortions of
competition (EC 2016).1 Moreover, some analysts speculate that the wholesale market
will over time be eroded by zero marginal-cost renewables, with virtually all action
shifting to the capacity market. In short, the debate around capacity mechanisms is one
of the biggest policy issues for the future design of electricity markets.
In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark model of long-run investment with a
capacity mechanism. Our main interest lies in understanding the optimal policy design
when the regulator can use multiple instruments: a wholesale price cap and a capac-
ity mechanism. We study three types of capacity mechanism: a capacity payment and
capacity auction, both market-wide, and a targeted strategic reserve.
The key features of the model are as follows. First, we consider a wide range
technically, a continuum of generation technologies, with the standard trade-o¤ that a
lower production cost comes with a higher investment cost.2 This enables us to study how
1Capacity mechanisms also face a variety of practical challenges, ranging from the political inuence
on capacity procurement (Newbery & Grubb 2015), to the appropriate setting of de-rating factors for
di¤erent generation technologies, to legal issues related to State Aid (EC 2016).
2Electricity markets are characterized by a range of generation technologies such as coal, diesel, hydro,
natural gas, nuclear, oil, solar and wind. Within each technology, there are di¤erent types of plant in
terms of size and e¢ ciency. This means that, in practice, there could be a dozen or more individual
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capacity mechanisms a¤ect base-load, mid-merit and peak generation units in potentially
di¤erent ways. Second, like much of the literature, we assume that demand is price-
inelastic. This approximates real-world behaviour and makes the analysis tractable. We
allow consumer demand be stochastic (which can also be interpreted as shifts in net
demand due to variable renewable generation).3 Third, if demand exceeds generation
capacity, there is forced rationing, in the form of rolling black-outs, leading to a welfare
loss for disconnected consumers. Moreover, we consider a system-cost externality which
represents lost welfare due to accidental system-wide black-outs or that it is costly for the
system operator to conduct rolling black-outs (Joskow & Tirole 2007; Fabra 2018; Llobet
& Padilla 2018). Fourth, our interest lies in the optimal design of capacity mechanisms
for the case of perfect competition among producers.4
We begin with the rst-best benchmark for optimal investment. Social welfare consists
of the gross consumer value from electricity minus production costs, investment costs and
the system cost. A social planner keeps on investing until the marginal benets of higher
consumer value and a lower system cost are equal to the investment cost. A higher
consumer value of lost load (VOLL) and a greater system-cost saving both lead to more
investment into peaking plant.
We then study market-based investment under perfect competition. We show that
there is a family of combinations of the price cap and capacity payment which achieves the
social optimum via the market. One member of this family is setting the price cap at the
VOLL and the capacity payment to internalize the system-cost externality. Establishing
this policy family makes precise how much uplift in a capacity payment is needed to
correct for di¤erent degrees of missing money.
In our model, there is a straightforward equivalence between (a) a capacity payment
that leads to a market-based capacity volume or (b) a capacity procurement volume with
a market-based capacity payment akin to a capacity auction. A higher capacity payment
and a higher price cap both raise investment and decreases the loss of load probability
(LOLP); in this sense, these policy instruments are substitutes. Similarly, higher procured
capacity leads to more investment and a higher capacity payment while, for a given
procured capacity, a higher price cap reduces the needfor a capacity payment.
A key observation is that these policy instruments work solely through their inuence
on peak plant. For baseload and mid-merit plant, the extra revenue from a higher capacity
payment is exactly o¤set by the reduction in scarcity rent. The additional revenues, in
equilibrium, go solely to nancing new investment into peak plant.
We present two extensions to the benchmark model. First, we study how intermittent
technology-types. We use a continuum to approximate this real-world diversity of discrete technologies.
3We do not attempt to model demand-side response (which is sometimes interpreted as a form of
capacity mechanism) or electrical battery storage.
4Some of the ner details of capacity-market design are beyond our scope including the optimal setting
of penalties for non-delivery and including reliability options (ROs) in the design.
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renewables enhance the need for a capacity mechanism. Renewables crowd out conven-
tional generation via a merit-order e¤ect; all else equal, this exacerbates the system-cost
externality by making it more di¢ cult to control the power system. When rm capacity
from conventional generation acts as a complement to intermittency, this raises the social
value of investment in peaking plant which is incentivized by a higher capacity payment.
Second, we outline a new socially-optimal design of a strategic reserve. A capacity
payment that discriminates between plants inside and outside the reserve can easily lead to
market distortions in investment. The key idea of our design is to avoid such ine¢ ciencies
by paying an extra-high price to non-reserve plants whenever the reserve is used.
Contribution to the literature. We contribute to a growing theoretical literature
on capacity mechanisms. By considering a continuum of generation types, our approach
di¤ers from prior work which assumes a single representative technology (e.g. Léautier
2016; Fabra 2018) or two discrete technologies, sometimes interpreted as conventional
and renewable generation (e.g. Llobet & Padilla 2018). Joskow & Tirole (2007) allow
for a continuum of technologies but focus on cases with only a few demand outcomes
so producers invest only into 2-3 types of technologies.5 Moreover, unlike us, previous
literature on capacity markets often focuses on issues of market power.
Our work also relates to the classic literature on peak-load pricing which studies in-
vestment for a discrete set of technologies (see, e.g., Crew & Kleindorfer 1986). Our
approach is similar to the model of Zöttl (2010) which, as far as we know, was rst to use
a continuous framework to study investment in electricity markets but does not consider
capacity payments or price caps.6 For markets with inelastic demand, peak-load pricing
with discrete technologies corresponds to the screening curve analysiswhich is widely
used in the economics of electricity markets (Stoft 2002; Biggar & Hesamzadeh 2014;
Léautier 2019). Our work simplies existing results from this literature and broadens the
analysis to include capacity mechanisms and system-cost externalities.
In sum, given these di¤erences, we obtain several novel results including: (i) character-
izing the family of socially-optimal combinations of a price cap and capacity payment, (ii)
identifying the system-cost complementarity between renewables and conventional plant
as the key driver of an enhanced need for a capacity mechanism, and (iii) deriving an
equivalent socially-optimal design of a targeted strategic reserve.
Plan for the paper. Section 2 lays out our model. Section 3 characterizes the rst-
best outcome. Section 4 studies market-based investment with the policy instruments
of a price cap and capacity mechanism. Section 5 analyzes the impacts of renewables
penetration. Section 6 outlines a socially-optimal design of a strategic reserve. Section 7
concludes and discusses policy implications. Proofs are in the Appendix.
5Teirilä & Ritz (2019) present simulation results on the new Irish capacity market with several gener-
ation technologies. See Tangerås (2018) for an analysis of capacity markets in a multi-country setting.
6Zöttl (2010) also considers investments under Cournot oligopoly.
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Figure 1: When demand " exceeds the market capacity "^, there is demand rationing and
the spot price is at the price cap p.
2 The model
We consider a two-stage game with investments in Stage 1 and production in Stage 2.
There is a continuum of production technologies with a continuum of marginal costs. We
let k (c) be the investment cost per unit of power for a technology with marginal cost
c 2 [0; p ], where p is the reservation price (value of lost load, VOLL) for consumers.
To get well-behaved solutions, we assume k (c) 2 (0; p), k0 (c) 2 ( 1; 0) and k00 (c) > 0
for c 2 [0; p ]. Hence, as in practice, technologies with a higher marginal cost have a
lower investment cost, k0 (c) < 0, at a diminishing rate, k00 (c) > 0. We also assume
that consumersVOLL is su¢ ciently high, p > p0 = k (0) =[ k0 (0)], which ensures that
socially-optimal investments are positive. The total quantity invested in technologies
with a marginal cost below c is denoted by q (c). The inverse of this supply function
corresponds to a marginal cost curve C 0 (q).
At the investment stage, there is uncertainty about consumerselectricity demand. In
particular, demand " follows a probability distribution F (") and density f (") with the
support [0; "] where we assume f (") > 0 for (0; "). We can think of F (") as being the
fraction of time that demand is less than ", in which case F (") would be similar to a
standard load duration curve.7 We let c be the highest marginal cost for which there
is investment. This technology cuto¤ is endogenously determined in our model. We let
"^ = q (c) be the corresponding total production capacity. As demand is assumed to be
price-inelastic, forced demand rationing (rolling blackouts) is needed to keep the system
in balance if " > "^ (that is, demand exceeds capacity). Hence, 1   F ("^) represents the
loss of load probability (LOLP). Figure 1 illustrates.
We assume that loss of load, in addition to the lost surplus of rationed consumers,
7The distribution F (") can also be interpreted as net demand for conventional generation, taking into
account production from renewables; we pursue this analysis further in Section 5.
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has a system externality M ("^). This might represent the expected cost of performing
rolling black outs. Letting J denote the realized system cost of conducting controlled
rolling black-outs, which may be a function of the rationed volume "  "^, we haveM ("^) =R "
"^
f (") J ("  "^) d". An alternative interpretation ofM ("^) is as the (expected) welfare loss
due to accidental uncontrolled system-wide black outs; more investment then improves
system reliability which is a public good. We assume that: (i) higher installed capacity
reduces the system cost, at a decreasing rate, M 0 ("^)  0  M 00 ("^); and (ii) to avoid
boundary solutions and yield an interesting analysis, the invested capacity "^ must lie
below " (the highest demand realization), which will hold as long as k (p) < [ M 0 ("^)].
3 Socially-optimal investment and the technology mix
We begin by solving the problem of a social planner who makes investment and produc-
tion decisions in order to maximize social welfare. Social welfare is comprised of three
components. First, it can be shown that the total investment cost in the rst stage is
given by:
K =
Z c
0
k (c) q0 (c) dc: (1)
We see that q0 (c) is essentially a density function. For small c, q0 (c) c is the volume
of investment into technologies with marginal costs in the range c to c + c. The asso-
ciated investment cost is k (c) q0 (c) c. The total investment cost accounts for all such
incremental costs up to c (the highest marginal cost for which there is investment).
Second, the social planner in second stage minimizes production cost by starting the
cheapest production plants, for which the total output equals the shock " and subject to
the total installed production capacity "^ = q (c). It can be shown that the expected total
production cost plus system cost is:8
T =
Z "^
0
f (")C (") d"+ C ("^) (1  F ("^)) +M ("^) : (2)
The expected production cost has two parts: the rst represents outcomes without ra-
tioning; the second represents those when forced rationing occurs and production is at
full capacity "^. Finally, M ("^) is the system cost at total production capacity "^.
Third, the expected benets to electricity consumers in the second stage can be cal-
culated in a similar way:9
B = p
Z "^
0
f (") "d"+ p"^ (1  F ("^)) . (3)
8Note that
R "
"^
f (")C ("^) d" = C ("^) (1  F ("^)).
9Note that
R "
"^
f (") "^d" = "^ (1  F ("^)).
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The social planner chooses the distribution function q (c) and technology cuto¤ c to
maximize social welfare W  B   T  K. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 It is socially-optimal to make generation investments such that the in-
verse marginal cost curve becomes:
q (c) = F 1 (1 + k0 (c)) for c 2 [0; c] (4)
q (c) = q (c) for c 2 [c; p] ;
where the technology cuto¤ c is implicitly determined from:
  (p   c) k0 (c)  k (c) M 0 (q (c)) = 0; (5)
which has a unique solution in the range [0; p].
Proposition 1 characterizes socially-optimal investment based on the trade-o¤between
investment and production costs. The condition for optimal investments can be under-
stood by rearranging (4) to give 1   F (q (c)) =  k0 (c). Consider a planner choosing
between two technologies with a (small) marginal-cost di¤erence c. Investing in the
technology with lower marginal cost saves [1  F (q (c))] c in expected production costs,
as 1  F (q (c)) is the probability that demand will be larger than q (c), i.e. the probabil-
ity that the plant will be used. On the other hand, this incurs an extra [ k0 (c)] c in
investment costs. At the optimum, the social planner is indi¤erent at the margin between
such similar investments. Our optimality condition is simpler but results with a similar
intuition have been found in a continuous investment framework (Zöttl 2010) and for
discrete peak-load pricing (Crew & Kleindorfer 1976).
A key insight from our rst-order condition is that neither the VOLL of consumers
p nor the system cost M() have any inuence on socially-optimal investments below
the technology cuto¤ c  though they do a¤ect the cuto¤ itself. To explore the cuto¤
condition further, note that (4) holds also at c, so we can rewrite the condition as:
(p   c) (1  F (q (c))) M 0 (q (c))  k (c) = 0: (6)
The rst term gives the consumer benet from additional investment, and the second
term represents the benet of a lower system cost. The planner continues to invest until
these marginal benets at the optimum c are equal to the investment cost k (c). A higher
consumer reservation price (higher p) and a steeper decrease in system costs (higher
 M 0 ()) both induce more investment into peaking plant.
Optimality can be expressed in another intuitive form. Let  = [ ck0 (c) =k(c)]c=c > 0
denote the elasticity of investment costs with respect to production costs, evaluated at
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the optimum technology cuto¤ c. This is a measure of the technology trade-o¤:  is larger
if a lower production cost comes with a greater increase in investment cost, so technology
is less exible in that sense. This allows us to rewrite (4):10
c = p
2664 
 + 1   M
0 (F 1 (1 + k0 (c)))
k (c)
3775 < p. (7)
We see that the cuto¤ c is higher for higher consumer VOLL (higher p) and less exible
available generation technology (higher ); the former makes investment more valuable,
and the latter makes it more necessary.11 The cuto¤ is also higher with a steeper decrease
in system costs (higher  M 0 ()), as this also makes investment more valuable.
In the special case without a system-cost externality (M ()  0), the cuto¤ c =
p=(+ 1) is independent of the distribution of consumer demand F (). As any changes
in the shape of F () leave c unchanged, it follows directly from (4) that the socially-
optimal LOLP is also unchanged.
4 Market-based investment and capacity mechanisms
We now turn to the investment and technology mix delivered by a competitive market.
The regulator has two instruments: setting a price cap in the wholesale electricity market
and designing a uniform market-wide capacity payment. Our main interest lies in deriving
the optimal policy design that delivers the social optimum.
4.1 Model setup and additional assumptions
In Stage 2, produced electricity is paid a spot price p ("). In a competitive market,
the price can be implicitly determined from " = q (p), that is, demand equals supply.
Moreover, there is a price cap p which the highest spot price allowed by the wholesale
market design. In the case of forced demand rationing, the spot price equals the price
cap. Our analysis allows for price caps above the VOLL, and we dene bp = min (p; p).12
In Stage 1, producers are paid a US-styleuniform capacity payment z 2 [0; k (bp)) for
each unit of invested capacity.
10Recall that our assumptions ensure that  M 0 () =k (c) < 1 so that c < p.
11As the available technology becomes very exible with  ! 0, the trade-o¤ between production
cost and investment cost disappears, so the planner can achieve rst-best while relying almost only on
abundant very low marginal cost generation and so the technology cuto¤ c! 0.
12As will become clear, when investments are a public good (via the system externality M ("^)), it can
be socially-optimal to occasionally have prices above the VOLL. It is therefore implicit in our setup that
consumers do not quit the market so that the socially-optimal solution can be implemented. This could
be justied, for example, by such consumers being compensated via the wider tax system.
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4.2 Competitive equilibrium and optimal policy design
In a competitive market, q (c) is the market supply curve, i.e., the market capacity with
marginal cost below c. In equilibrium, price equals marginal cost, p (q (c)) = c, so a plant
with marginal cost c will produce for "  q (c) which corresponds to p (")  c.
The expected prot from an investment into a unit of a technology with marginal cost
c 2 (0; c) is therefore given by:
 (c) = z   k (c) +
Z "^
q(c)
(p (")  c) f (") d"+ (p  c) [1  F ("^)] : (8)
The rst two terms are the capacity payment and investment cost; the third is the prot
ow from the spot market. The last term is often referred to as the expected scarcity rent
(Stoft, 2002). Competitive entry means that the zero-prot condition  (c)  0 holds, for
every technology c 2 (0; c), in equilibrium.
Our next result derives the policies that achieve the social optimum via the market:
Proposition 2 Investments are socially optimal when i) the price cap is at or above the
socially optimal technology cuto¤, i.e. p  c, and ii)
z =  M 0 (q (c))  k0 (c) (p   p) : (9)
This for example holds when the price cap equals the VOLL, p = p, and the capacity
payment internalizes the marginal system-cost externality, z =  M 0 (q (c)).
Proposition 2 formalizes how market-based investment, augmented by an optimally-
designed price cap and capacity payment, can replicate the socially-optimal technology
mix of Proposition 1.
We derive (9) as the key condition which characterizes the family (p; z) of price caps
and capacity payments that achieves the social optimum. Figure 2 illustrates. A leading
special case is setting the price cap at the VOLL, p = p, and the capacity payment to
reect the marginal system cost, z =  M 0 (q (c)). From a policy perspective, this estab-
lishes a rationale for the use of a capacity mechanism even where the wholesale market
design has the correct price cap set at the VOLL. The reason is that an additional
instrument is needed to correct for the system-cost externality of generation capacity.13
The same condition also makes precise how a capacity mechanism can correct for the
missing money problem. Specically, suppose that for reasons of political economy,
the price cap is set too low with p < p; (9) tells us that a capacity payment of z =
 M 0 (q (c)) + (p   p) [ k0 (c)] restores optimality. This includes an uplift equal to
13Fabra (2018) obtains a similar nding with a single generation technology and a price cap always
set at the VOLL, p = p. See also Llobet & Padilla (2018) for a related result with two generation
technologies. Our analysis goes further by characterizing the family of all optimal policy combinations.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the family (p; z) of price caps and capacity payments that achieves
the social optimum in a competitive market.
(p   p) [ k0 (c)] relative to full scarcity pricing. From the viewpoint of producers, the
split of revenues between the energy and capacity markets can vary widely even where
overall regulation is optimally-designed.
4.3 Policy equivalence: Capacity payment vs capacity auction
In our model, it is equivalent for the regulator to set a capacity payment z resulting in
market-based invested capacity b" or to instead set a capacity level b" which is delivered by
a market-based capacity price z in capacity auction.14 The reason is that producers have
symmetric information, so even if there is a demand shock in the spot market, there are
no surprises in the capacity market; in equilibrium, producers can predict the outcome of
the capacity auction. With symmetric information and small price-taking producers, it
is equivalent for the regulator to set price(capacity payment) or quantity(capacity
volume) akin to Weitzman (1974).
Before deriving comparative statics on the impacts of the two di¤erent policy imple-
mentations, we want to establish that our results do extend to cases where (p; z) do not
necessarily belong to the family that achieves the social optimum. First, we establish a
generalised version of the technology cuto¤. For any price p > p0, we can implicitly dene
a cuto¤ c (p) from
  (p  c (p)) k0 (c (p))  k (c (p)) M 0 (q (c (p))) = 0;
which is a generalised version of (5). The results in Proposition 2 can now be generalised
as follows.
14The cuto¤ condition in Proposition 1 depend on the VOLL p which, in practice, can be di¢ cult to
estimate. Cramton and Stoft (2005) recommend that the regulator sets a su¢ ciently high capacity levelb" to makes LOLP acceptably low and then procures this using a capacity auction.
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Proposition 3 For the price cap p > p0 and capacity payment z =  M 0 (q (c (p))), the
technology cuto¤ for investments is c (p) and the supply function is
q (c) = F 1 (1 + k0 (c)) for c 2 [0; c (p)] : (10)
The same investments would follow for an alternative price cap ~p  c (p), if
z =  M 0 (q (c (p)))  k0 (c (p)) (p  ~p)
= k (c (p)) + k0 (c (p)) (~p  c (p)) : (11)
We will be using these conditions in the comparative statics analysis. Note that
somewhat similar to our analysis of the social optimum, the equilibrium condition in (10)
implies that market-based investments below the technology cuto¤ c do not depend on
the price cap p or on the capacity payment z. Hence, these policy instruments inuence
only investments into peaking plant.
4.3.1 Comparative statics: Capacity payment and price cap
Proposition 4 Consider a capacity mechanism where the capacity payment z is set by
the market design:
(i)The technology cuto¤ c increases for a higher capacity payment z:
@c
@z
=
1
(p  c) k00 (c) > 0 (12)
and for a higher price cap p:
@c
@p
=
 k0 (c)
(p  c) k00 (c) > 0: (13)
(ii) The loss of load probability, 1  F (q (c)), decreases for a higher capacity payment z:
@ (1  F (q (c)))
@z
=  f (q (c)) q0 (c) @c
@z
< 0
and decreases for a higher price cap p:
@ (1  F (q (c)))
@p
=  f (q (c)) q0 (c) @c
@p
< 0.
Proposition 4 shows that a higher capacity payment and price cap both raise invest-
ment and decrease the LOLP. In this sense, these two policy instruments are substitutes.
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4.3.2 Comparative statics: Capacity volume and price cap
Proposition 5 Consider a capacity mechanism where the capacity volume "^ is set by the
market design and the capacity payment z is endogenously determined. A higher procured
capacity "^ raises the technology cuto¤ c:
@c
@"^
=
f ("^)
k00 (c)
> 0, (14)
and raises the capacity payment z:
@z
@"^
= (p  c) f ("^) > 0: (15)
Proposition 5 shows how a capacity auction that procures more capacity investment
brings a higher technology cuto¤ and requires a higher capacity payment. The rst part
of the result, @c=@"^ = f ("^) =k00 (c) > 0, follows directly from the condition (10) which
ensures that producers are indi¤erent between investment alternatives.
The second part of the result can be understood as follows. If investments increase by
a (small) b", producers will now be paid c instead of the higher price cap p for shocks
in the range ["^; "^+ b"]. Shocks are in this range with probability f ("^) b". Therefore,
to ensure that the expected prot from marginal investments remains zero, a competitive
market adjusts the capacity payment upwards by (p  c) f ("^) b".
Proposition 6 Consider a capacity mechanism where the capacity volume "^ is set by
the market design and the capacity payment z is endogenously determined. For a given
procured capacity "^, a higher price cap p has no impact on the technology cuto¤ c:
dc
dp

"^ xed
= 0, (16)
and reduces the capacity payment z:
dz
dp

"^ xed
= k0 (c) < 0: (17)
The rst part of Proposition 6 again follows directly from (10); the technology cuto¤ is
unchanged if invested capacity is unchanged. The second part can be understood by using
[1   F ("^)] =  k0 (c) from (4) to rewrite (17) as [dz=dp]"^ xed =  [1   F ("^)]. Producers
are paid the price cap p when there is demand rationing, which occurs with probability
1 F ("^). Hence, if the price cap is increased by a (small) p, then the capacity payment
must decline by p [1  F ("^)] to keep expected prot from marginal investments at zero.
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4.3.3 Payo¤ impacts of a capacity mechanism and price cap
How does a capacity mechanism a¤ect the overall payo¤ of producers? On one hand, by
Proposition 4, a higher capacity payment makes outcomes with forced rationing less likely,
which reduces producersexpected scarcity rent. On the other hand, a higher capacity
payment creates an additional revenue stream. Similarly, a higher price cap means more
revenue in the event of forced rationing but also makes this event less likely. Our next
result claries the net e¤ect of these two forces:
Proposition 7 Consider a market with the initial technology cuto¤ c0. If the capacity
payment z and/or the procured capacity b" and/or the price cap p is increased, then:
(i) Total expected revenue from the spot market and the capacity mechanism is unchanged
for each plant with a marginal cost below the cuto¤ c0:
(ii) All of the additional expected revenue covers production and investment costs of new
generation investments into plant with a marginal cost above c0.
Proposition 7 shows that, in equilibrium, a higher capacity payment or price cap have
no impact (neither in terms of payo¤s or investments) on plant below the technology cuto¤.
This is consistent with our earlier nding from Proposition 2 that these do not inuence
investment below the technology cuto¤. Given their equivalence, the same conclusion also
applies to higher procured capacity. The resulting additional revenues to producers solely
nance the new generation investment occurring at/above the old technology cuto¤.
5 The impact of renewables penetration
A central feature of the future electricity market is that it will be dominated by renewable
generation from solar and wind. In the policy debate, the growth of intermittent renew-
ables and its adverse impact on the demand for conventional generation is frequently
asserted as a justication for a capacity mechanism. In this section, we use our model to
formally characterize the impact of renewables on investment in conventional generation,
the socially-optimal LOLP and on the optimal design of capacity mechanism.
5.1 Model setup and additional assumptions
We generalize the model as follows. First, let w denote the (exogenous) level of installed
renewables capacity, interpreted as consumersown production such as rooftop solar power
or other intermittent renewable generation such as wind power supplied by an exogenous
fringe (with zero marginal cost). Write F ("; w) as the probability distribution of net
demand for conventional plant and assume that the probability that net demand is below
some level " increases with more renewable generation, @F (";w)
@w
> 0. We allow the strength
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of the crowding-out e¤ect to vary along F () (e.g., with the time of year). Second, write
M ("^; w) as the system-cost externality, where "^ is installed conventional capacity. We
assume that the system cost rises with renewables, @M("^;w)
@w
 0, and that this e¤ect is
mitigated by conventional generation, @
@"^
h
@M("^;w)
@w
i
= @
2M("^;w)
@"^@w
 0. The former describes
how intermittent renewables make it more di¢ cult to control the power system; the latter
captures the idea that rm capacityacts as complement to this intermittency.15 Third,
we use q (c; w) to denote socially-optimal conventional supply with marginal cost below
c, so q (c; w) = " is the condition for market clearing given renewables w.
5.2 Renewables and optimal investment
The optimality conditions from Proposition 1 for investment and the technology cut-
o¤ from (4) and (5) are valid for any net-demand distribution F . It does not matter
whether that probability distribution has been inuenced by wind power or not. Hence,
for installed wind capacity w, the condition for optimal investment from (4) becomes:
1  F (q (c; w) ; w) =  k0 (c) . (18)
Similarly, the condition for the optimal technology cuto¤ c from (5) becomes:
  (p   c) k0 (c)  k (c)  @M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^
= 0, (19)
where q (c; w) = "^ is the total conventional production capacity and the LOLP is 1  
F ("^; w).
This leads immediately to the following initial nding:
Lemma 1 For a given technology mix (i.e., xed c), higher renewables capacity reduces
conventional supply, @q(c;w)
@w
< 0.
For a given technology mix, higher renewable capacity always reduces the conventional
supply. This is an instance of the widely-discussed merit-order e¤ect of renewables pen-
etration. It is a consequence of more renewables making low realizations of net demand
for conventional plant more likely (@F (";w)
@w
> 0).
Our rst result builds on this to characterize the equilibrium impact of more renewables
capacity on the optimal technology cuto¤ and LOLP:
Proposition 8 Higher renewables capacity raises the optimal technology cuto¤, dc
dw
 0,
and reduces the socially-optimal LOLP dLOLP
dw
 0. In the special case with no system-cost
externality, i.e., M("^; w)  0, both impacts are zero, dc
dw
= 0 and dLOLP
dw
= 0.
15For a given level of w, we retain our previous assumptions on F () and M().
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The main insight from Proposition 8 is that higher renewables capacity raises the
socially-optimal technology cuto¤. In other words, it becomes optimal to bring to market
some conventional plant technologies with high marginal cost that were previously not
needed. This formalizes the commonly-expressed view that renewables raise the social
value of peaking plant. An immediate implication is that, at the social optimum, the
LOLP declines with more renewables.
These renewables impacts hinge crucially on the presence of the system-cost external-
ity M ("^; w). They also rely on the complementarity property: having more conventional
plant mitigates any incremental system externality created by renewables. In its absence,
more renewables capacity has zero impact on the social optimum. This follows directly
from Proposition 1: if M()  0, optimal investment and the technology mix are inde-
pendent of the distribution of net demand.16
Note the tension underlying these ndings. On one hand, the merit-order e¤ectfrom
Lemma 1 is that, for a given technology mix c, renewables reduce conventional supply.
On the other hand, the system-complementarity e¤ect from Proposition 8 says that
renewables raise the technology cuto¤ c, so additional peaking plant are needed. Our
next result presents a condition on the overall impact on conventional capacity:
Proposition 9 Higher renewables capacity reduces the socially-optimal conventional ca-
pacity, dq(c;w)
dw
 0, if the merit-order e¤ect dominates the system-complementarity e¤ect:
(p   c)  @
2M ("^; w)
@"^2

@F ("^; w)
@"

@F ("^; w)
@w
  @
2M ("^; w)
@"^@w
.
In general, the overall impact, taking into account the knock-on e¤ect of renewables
on the optimal technology mix, is theoretically ambiguous. Proposition 9 makes precise
when the overall impact is such that the socially-optimal conventional generation capacity
declines. The underlying condition is that the residual-demand e¤ect of more renewables
dominates the system-complementarity e¤ect, that is, the cross-partial @
2M("^;w)
@"^@w
cannot be
too negative.17
5.3 Renewables and capacity-mechanism design
We now turn to characterizing the impact of more renewables on the design of a capacity
mechanism. Like before, we begin by noting that the result from Proposition 2 on the
price cap and capacity payment that achieve social optimality remains valid for any given
16Biggar & Hesamzadeh (2014, pp. 192-194) obtain an instance of this nding from a graphical screen-
ing curve analysis with two conventional technologies.
17The condition is, of course, also always met in the absence of any system-cost externality, M()  0.
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w. In particular, the family of socially-optimal policy instruments from (9) now becomes:
z (w; p) +
@M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^
+ (p   p) k0 (c) = 0, (20)
which makes explicit the potential dependency of the capacity payment z (w; p) on renew-
ables and the price cap.
Our next result formalizes how higher renewables penetration a¤ects the design of the
capacity payment:
Proposition 10 For any price cap p, higher renewables capacity increases the socially-
optimal capacity payment, @z(w;p)
@w
 0. In the special case with no system-cost externality,
i.e., M("^; w)  0, the impact is zero, @z(w;p)
@w
= 0.
Proposition 10 shows how increased renewables penetration exacerbates the need for
a capacity mechanism. For any given level of the price cap, the socially-optimal optimal
capacity payment increases. Hence the optimal family of policy instruments (p; z) shown
in Figure 2 is pushed outwards.
This is a direct implication of our nding from Proposition 8 that renewables increase
the social value of peaking plant. Given that the price cap is held constant, this additional
investment is optimally procured by way of a higher capacity payment. Once again, the
result hinges crucially on the presence of the system-cost externality.
In sum, our model shows how the combination of increased renewables penetration
and a system-cost complementarity between renewables and conventional plant raises the
social value of peaking plant and can justify higher capacity payments to conventional
generators.
6 An optimally-designed strategic reserve
Some countries use a strategic reserve instead of a market-wide capacity market. A reserve
is discriminatory in that a capacity payment is made only to generation units within the
reserve. An argument in favour is that this limits the market operations of the system
operator (SO) to procuring a (small) reserve. This is an advantage in Europe where a
SO often owns the transmission network and accordingly has congestion rents and the
regulator wishes to contain this dominant position. It is less of an issue in restructured
US electricity markets with independent SOs (ISOs) that do not own any grid assets.18
Yet it is also clear that discriminating between plants inside and outside the reserve
can easily lead to market distortions. For example, if plants both inside and outside the
reserve are paid the same electricity price when the reserve in used, which is the case in
18This also explains why US day-ahead markets are centralized and organized by an ISO while markets
are more decentralized in Europe (Ahlquist et al. 2019).
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Sweden, then the revenue of plants in the reserve are disproportionately large, as they
also get a capacity payment. This distorts investments.
We next present an optimally-balanced market design with a strategic reserve that
avoids any such competitive ine¢ ciencies. In a nutshell, this can be achieved by paying
an extra-high spot price to non-reserve plants whenever the reserve is used.
6.1 Model setup and additional assumptions
The model is a variation on the previous setup. In Stage 1, plants in the strategic reserve
is paid a uniform capacity payment z 2 [0; k (bp)) for each unit of invested capacity. In
Stage 2, electricity produced outside the reserve is paid a spot price p ("). We let q (p)
and b" denote the supply and total capacity of non-reserve plants, respectively. Hence,
for " 2 (0;b"), the spot price can be implicitly determined from " = q (p). The strategic
reserve is triggeredwhen the non-reserve capacity has been exhausted, i.e., " > b". In
this case, the spot price for non-reserve plant is at the price cap p irrespective of whether
there is demand rationing. This means revenues of non-reserve plants are independent of
the size of the strategic reserve. We let b"r denote total production capacity including the
reserve.
In a competitive market, reserve plant bid and o¤er at marginal cost. We let qr (c) be
the total market supply curve, including supply from the reserve. If the reserve is used,
" > b", but there is no forced rationing, " < b"r, then the clearing price of the reserve pr
is determined from " = qr (pr). We have pr < p, so for the demand range " 2 (b";b"r),
plants in the reserve are paid a lower spot price than plants outside the reserve. If the
reserve is used and there is forced rationing, " > b"r, also plants in the reserve are paid
the price cap p. Let c be the highest marginal cost for which there is investment in the
conventional market, and let cr be the highest marginal cost for which there is investment
in the reserve.
6.2 Competitive equilibrium and optimal policy design
Competitive entry ensures that the zero-prot condition  (c)  0 holds in equilibrium,
both for plants in the reserve and outside the reserve. Under the above assumptions, we
can show that the strategic reserve is equivalent to a US-style market with a uniform
capacity payment z and price cap p:
Proposition 11 For a market design with a strategic reserve where p > p0+M
0 (q (c (p0))) =k
0 (c (p0)):
19
19Recall that p0 is the lowest VOLL level for which we can ensure positive socially optimal investments.
Hence, c (p0) and q (c (p

0)) are the socially-optimal technology cuto¤ and market capacity, respectively,
for that lowest VOLL level.
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(i) There is a highest marginal cost c 2 (0; bp) for which there is investment in the
non-reserve market, where this cuto¤ satises:
 k (c)  (p  c) k0 (c) = 0: (21)
(ii) There is a highest marginal cost cr > c for which there is investment in the reserve,
where this cuto¤ is determined from the same condition as for a uniform capacity payment
z and a price cap p:
z   k (cr)  (p  cr) k0 (cr) = 0: (22)
(iii) Investments in the non-reserve and the reserve give rise to a total supply curve qr (c),
which below the cuto¤ cr is determined by:
qr (c) = F
 1 (1 + k0 (c)) . (23)
(iv) Investments are socially optimal whenever the price cap p and the capacity payment
z to the reserve satisfy:
z +M 0 (q (cr)) + (p   p) k0 (cr) = 0, (24)
which for example holds if the price cap equals the VOLL, p = p, and the capacity
payment to the reserve internalizes the marginal system-cost externality, z =  M 0 (q (cr)).
(v) When the reserve is used, a non-reserve plant is paid a higher spot price than reserve
plant. The di¤erence p   pr is, in expectation, equal to the capacity payment z of the
reserve.
Part (v) is the central result of Proposition 11: it is possible to design a targeted
strategic reserve that is as distortion-free as a market-wide capacity payment. As a
whole, the market design with a strategic reserve does not discriminate between plants
inside and outside the reserve. This non-discrimination property is crucial to avoiding
over- or underinvestment in either conventional plants or in the strategic reserve itself.
The optimal design requires that, whenever the strategic reserve is used, the spot price
should be at the price cap, while plants in the reserve should be paid the clearing price
of the reserve. Given this, the strategic reserve is as e¢ cient as the market design from
Proposition 2, with an identical price cap and a discriminatory capacity payment to the
strategic reserve at the same level as the previous market-wide capacity payment.
Parts (i)(iv) are analogs to now familiar conditions from Proposition 2.
As far as we know, this optimal design of a strategic reserve is novel. It has both
similarities and di¤erences relative to how strategic reserves are operated in practice. The
underlying principle of trying to isolate the operation of the reserve from the wholesale
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market appears to be well-understood. A central feature of our design is that reserve
plant in addition to receiving a capacity payment make competitive bids so there is
also a clearing price for the reserve itself. In this sense, our design captures symmetrically
the benets of competition for both non-reserve and reserve plant.
7 Conclusions and policy implications
We have introduced a new benchmark model of long-run investment and the optimal
design of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market. Relative to existing
literature, the main di¤erentiating features of our approach are: (i) a continuum of gen-
eration technologies which represents the range of baseload, mid-merit and peaking plant
(ii) joint modelling, also as a continuum, of two policy instruments: a wholesale price cap
and capacity payment, and (iii) an externality arising from the system costs associated
with a blackout.
We showed how socially-optimal generation investment can be achieved through the
market using di¤erent combinations of a price cap and a capacity payment (or, equiva-
lently, a capacity auction). From a policy perspective, we obtain a rationale for the use
of a capacity mechanism even where the wholesale-market design has the correctprice
cap set at the VOLL. The reason is that an additional instrument is needed to correct for
a system-cost externality that arises in the event of a black-out. Our characterization of
the family of optimal policies makes precise how much upliftin a capacity payment is
needed to correct for di¤erent degrees of missing money.
We presented two extensions. First, we showed how increased penetration of inter-
mittent renewables exacerbates the need for a capacity mechanism. In the presence of
a system-cost complementarity between renewables and conventional generation, more
renewables raise the social value of peaking plant and thereby justify a higher capacity
payment. Second, we outlined a new socially-optimal design of a strategic reserve with
a discriminatory capacity payment. It avoids investment distortions between plants in-
side and outside the reserve by paying an extra-high spot price to non-reserve plant and
thereby making the non-reserve market independent of the size of the strategic reserve.
More broadly, our analysis suggests that capacity mechanisms may be a longer-term
feature of optimal electricity market design, especially in the presence of high renewables
penetration, rather than merely being a x to a near-term supply crunch. Future research
may wish to build on our benchmark results to study the implications of the exercise of
market power.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof for the social optimum proceeds in two main
steps. In Step 1, we nd the supply function q (c) that minimizes the sum of investment
and production costs for a given technology cuto¤ c. In Step 2, we nd the optimal
technology cuto¤ c and corresponding optimal investment level q (c) that reect consumer
preferences. In the proof, we make use of the function H ("), dened such that H (0) = 0
and H 0 (") = F (").
Step 1. We wish to nd the function q (c) that minimizes the sum of investment cost
K and expected production cost T for a given technology cuto¤ c and the corresponding
q (c). This becomes straightforward once we have an expression that involves q (c) but
none of its derivatives; then we can nd an optimal q (c) for each c, independently of other
marginal-cost levels. Also, we want to get rid of related terms involving C () and C 0 ().
First, we rewrite the investment cost in this desired form. Using integration by parts,
(1) can be rewritten as:
K =
Z c
0
k (c) q0 (c) dc = [q (c) k (c)]c0  
Z c
0
q (c) k0 (c) dc
= q (c) k (c)  q (0) k (0) 
Z c
0
q (c) k0 (c) dc: (25)
Second, we use integration by parts to rewrite the expected production cost (2):
T =
Z "^
0
f (")C (") d"+ C (q (c)) (1  F ("^)) +M ("^)
= [F (")C (")]"^0  
Z "^
0
F (")C 0 (") d"+ C (q (c)) (1  F ("^)) +M ("^)
= C (q (c)) 
Z "^
0
F (")C 0 (") d"+M ("^)
= C (q (c)) 
Z c
0
F (q (c)) cq0 (c) dc+M ("^)
=
Z c
0
c (1  F (q (c))) q0 (c) dc+ C (q (0)) +M ("^)
=
Z c
0
c
d
dc
[q (c) H (q (c))] dc+ C (q (0)) +M ("^)
= [cq (c)  cH (q (c))]c0  
Z c
0
(q (c) H (q (c))) dc+ C (q (0)) +M ("^)
= c"^  cH ("^) + C (q (0)) 
Z c
0
(q (c) H (q (c))) dc+M ("^) . (26)
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We wish to minimize T +K which using (25) and (26) is equivalent to:
T +K = q (c) k (c)  q (0) k (0) + "^c+M ("^) H ("^) c+ C (q (0)) (27)
+
Z c
0
H (q (c))  q (c)  q (c) k0 (c)| {z }
=L
dc:
As the remaining terms do not depend on c, we want to nd the q (c) that minimizes L
for each c 2 [0; c), which can now be done independently of c and q (c). The rst- and
second-order conditions are:
@L
@q
= F (q)  1  k0 (c) = 0 and @
2L
@q2
= f (q)  0. (28)
The second-order condition ensures that the rst-order solution is a global minimum.
Hence the rst-order condition gives the cost-e¢ cient technology mix.
We can represent this technology mix by the supply function q^ (c), which corresponds
to an inverse marginal cost curve. The assumed properties of k0 (c) ensure that F (q) =
1 + k0 (c) 2 (0; 1). Hence, invertibility of F (q) over this range and the support of this
function, implies that for every c 2 [0; c) we have a unique solution q^ (c)  0. To conrm
that q^ (c) is monotonic and therefore a valid solution, we di¤erentiate the rst-order
condition:
f (q^) q^0(c)  k00(c) = 0 =) q^0(c) = k
00(c)
f (q^)
> 0: (29)
Step 2. We now wish to nd the optimal technology cuto¤ c and optimal investment level
q (c). Using (3) and (27) expected social welfare W  B   T  K can be written as:
W = p
Z q(c)
0
f (") "d"+ pq (c) (1  F (q (c)))
 q (c) c+H (q (c)) c  C (q (0)) 
Z c
0
(H (q (c))  q (c)) dc
+q (0) k (0)  q (c) k (c) +
Z c
0
q (c) k0 (c) dc M (q (c)) .
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Di¤erentiating this expression yields:
@W
@c
= pq0 (c) f (q (c)) q (c) + pq0 (c) (1  F (q (c)))
 pq (c) f (q (c)) q0 (c)  q0 (c) c  q (c) +
+F (q (c)) cq0 (c) +H (q (c))
  (H (q (c))  q (c))  q0 (c) k (c)  q (c) k0 (c)
+q (c) k0 (c) M 0 (q (c)) q0 (c)
= pq0 (c) (1  F (q (c)))  q0 (c) c+ F (q (c)) cq0 (c)
 q0 (c) k (c) M 0 (q (c)) q0 (c)
= (p   c) q0 (c) (1  F (q (c)))  q0 (c) k (c) M 0 (q (c)) q0 (c)
= q0 (c)
0B@(p   c) (1  F (q (c)))  k (c) M 0 (q (c))| {z }
=Y (c)
1CA : (30)
This implies the rst-order condition for social welfare is:
Y (c) = 0: (31)
We next conrm that Y (c) is decreasing when the technology mix is e¢ cient, that is,
(28) is satised:
Y 0 (c) =   (1  F (q (c)))  (p   c) f (q (c)) q0 (c)  k0 (c) M 00 (q (c)) q0 (c)
= k0 (c)  (p   c) k00 (c)  k0 (c) M 00 (q (c)) q0 (c)
< 0 for c 2 [0; p] ,
where the simplication makes use of the rst-order condition (28) and its derivative in
(29). The rst-order condition (28) and the assumed properties of k (c) and M (b") imply
that:
Y (0) =  pk0 (0)  k (0) M 0 (q (0)) > 0
Y (p) =  k (p) M 0 (q (p)) < 0.
Together with the property Y 0 (c) < 0, this ensures a unique solution to Y (c) = 0 in the
range (0; p). Since also q0 (c) > 0, it follows from (30) that:
@W
@c
 0 for c 2 [0; c] and @W
@c
 0 for c 2 [c; p] ,
so we can conclude that the rst-order condition Y (c) = 0 gives a social (global) optimum.
The following lemma is useful when proving Proposition 2, where we e.g. show that
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the conditions (32) and (33) are satised for the markets that we consider.
Lemma 2 Consider a perfectly competitive market, where the capacity payment is not
too low or too high, i.e.
z   k (0)  pk0 (0) > 0 (32)
z   k (bp)  (p  bp) k0 (bp) < 0: (33)
In this case, the following can be proven:
1. There is a highest marginal cost c 2 (0; bp) for which there is investment. This cuto¤
can be uniquely determined from:
z   k (c)  (p  c) k0 (c) = 0: (34)
2. Investments give rise to a supply curve q (c), which can be determined from:
q (c) = F 1 (1 + k0 (c)) (35)
for c 2 [0; c] :
Proof of Lemma 2. With competitive entry, the zero-prot condition  (c)  0 is an
identity. Hence, since entrants are price takers (so that p (q (c)) = c) and using Leibniz
rule, we can di¤erentiate both sides of (8) to get:
0 (c) =  k0 (c)  q0 (c) (p (q (c))  c) f (q (c)) 
Z "^
q(c)
f (") d"  (1  F ("^))
=  k0 (c)  (1  F (q (c)))
= 0,
which is the rst-order condition in (10). For the marginal technology c, we have "^ = q (c)
so the zero-prot condition based on (8) simplies to:
 (c) = z   k (c) + (p  c) (1  F ("^)) (36)
= z   k (c)  (p  c) k0 (c) (37)
= 0, (38)
where the second step uses (10). For given z and p, we can use this condition to solve for
c. To show that such a solution exists and is unique, let  (c) = z   k (c)   (p  c) k0 (c)
and di¤erentiate to get:
0 (c) =  k0 (c) + k0 (c)  (p  c) k00 (c) < 0 for c 2 [0; bp) .
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It follows from the conditions in (32) and (33) that:
 (0) = z   k (0)  pk0 (0) > 0;
 (bp) = z   k (bp)  (p  bp) k0 (bp) < 0.
These inequalities and 0 (c) < 0 ensure a unique solution to  (c) = 0 in the range (0; bp).
Proof of Proposition 2. We note that the rst-order condition for investments
in (35) is identical to that of Proposition (1). Hence, the competitive market yields
socially-optimal investments whenever (36) gives the same technology cuto¤ c as the
socially-optimal condition from (5), that is, the price cap p and capacity payment z are
such that:
z   k (c)  (p  c) k0 (c) =   (p   c) k0 (c)  k (c) M 0 (q (c)) ,
which is the case whenever (9) is satised, as claimed.
Next, we wish to establish that the family of socially-optimal instruments (p; z) from
(9) satises the two conditions (32) and (33) in Lemma 2:
Step 1. We start with the regularity condition from (32) that the capacity payment
should not be too small, which reads:
A = z   k (0)  pk0 (0) > 0.
Using (9) to express the capacity payment z in terms of the price cap p yields:
A =  M 0 ("^)  (p   p) k0 (c)  k (0)  pk0 (0) :
We wish to nd a lower bound on A, that is, a combination of parameter values for which
A is at a minimum from which it follows that indeed A > 0. In particular, we look for
the most critical p for given "^ and c.20 Under these circumstances, we have that:
dA
dp
= k0 (c)  k0 (0) > 0,
as k00 (c) > 0. Hence, for given "^ and c, A is bounded from below by the case where p& c
and so:
A >  M 0 ("^)  (p   c) k0 (c)  k (0)  ck0 (0)
= k (c)  k (0)  ck0 (0)
> 0,
20As we only need to identify a lower bound, we do not need to consider whether the worstcombi-
nation of parameter is actually consistent with some particular demand distribution.
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where the second line follows since we are at a social optimum, (5), and the last line
again follows from k00 (c) > 0. Hence, we conclude that the regularity condition in (32) is
satised for the socially-optimal instruments from (9).
Step 2. Next we consider the regularity condition from (33) that the capacity payment
should not be too large. There are two such cases. First, if p > p^ = p, then (33) can be
written as:
B = z   k (p) < 0.
We follow a similar approach to Step 1 but now wish to nd an upper bound on B. Again
using (9) to express the capacity payment z in terms of the price cap p yields:
B =  M 0 ("^)  (p   p) k0 (c)  k (p) :
For given "^ and c, we have:
dB
dp
= k0 (c)  k0 (p) < 0;
as k00 (c) > 0. Hence, for given "^ and c, B is bounded from above by the case where p& c
and so:
B <  M 0 ("^)  (p   c) k0 (c)  k (c)
= 0;
where the second line follows from (5). Hence, we conclude that the regularity condition
in (33) is satised in this case. Second, and nally, if p = p^ < p, then (33) can be written
as:
D = z   k (p)  (p  p) k0 (p) < 0.
Again using (9) to express the capacity payment z in terms of the price cap p yields:
D =  M 0 ("^)  (p   p) (k0 (c)  k0 (p))  k (p) :
For given "^ and c, we have:
dD
dp
= k0 (c)  k0 (p) < 0;
as k00 (c) > 0. Hence, for given "^ and c, D is bounded from above by the case where p& c
and so:
D <  M 0 ("^)  (p   c) (k0 (c)  k0 (p))  k (p)
= k (c)  k (p) + (p   c) k0 (p)
< 0 ,
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where the second line follows since we are at a social optimum, (5), and the last line
again follows from k00 (c) > 0. Hence, we conclude that the regularity condition in (33)
is satised also in this case. Therefore the two regularity conditions in (32) and (33) are
both satised for the socially-optimal instruments from (9), as required.
Proof of Proposition 3 Assume that p > p0 is a notional VOLL level that the social
planner uses when optimizing investments. Note that the notional level may di¤er from
the true VOLL level. Hence, we can use the results in Proposition 1 to determine a cuto¤
c (p) from the condition   (p  c) k0 (c)  k (c) M 0 (q (c)) = 0 and an associated supply
curve q (c) = F 1 (1 + k0 (c)), for c 2 [0; c (p)]. Next, we can use results in Proposition
2 to establish alternative price caps ~p and capacity payments that will give the same
investments as a social planner would for the notional VOLL level p. Equation (11)
follows from the zero-prot condition in (36).
Proof of Proposition 4. For the statement in part (i), implicit di¤erentiation of (11)
with respect to the capacity payment z yields:
1  k0 (c) @c
@z
+
@c
@z
k0 (c)  (p  c) k00 (c) @c
@z
= 0
1  (p  c) k00 (c) @c
@z
= 0 =) @c
@z
=
1
(p  c) k00 (c)  0.
Similarly, implicit di¤erentiation of (36) with respect to the price cap c yields:
 k0 (c) @c
@p
 

1  @c
@p

k0 (c)  (p  c) k00 (c) @c
@p
= 0
 k0 (c)  (p  c) k00 (c) @c
@p
= 0 =) @c
@p
=
 k0 (c)
(p  c) k00 (c)  0.
The statement in part (ii) follows straightforwardly using the results from part (i).
Proof of Proposition 5. The rst-order condition in (10) also holds at c and for
marginal changes in the capacity "^. Hence di¤erentiating with respect to the capacity
volume "^ gives:
 k00 (c) @c
@"^
+ f ("^) = 0 =) @c
@"^
=
f ("^)
k00 (c)
 0.
Moreover, implicit di¤erentiation of (11) with respect to "^ yields:
0 =
@z
@"^
  k0 (c) @c
@"^
+
@c
@"^
k0 (c)  (p  c) k00 (c) @c
@"^
=) @z
@"^
= (p  c) k00 (c) @c
@"^
= (p  c) f ("^)  0.
Proof of Proposition 6. The rst-order condition in (10) also holds at c; hence, c is
xed if "^ is xed and so dc
dp

"^ xed
= 0. Moreover, implicit di¤erentiation of (11) with
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respect to p shows that dz
dp

"^ xed
= k0 (c) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Di¤erentiating the condition for optimal investment from (18)
shows the impact of more renewables, for any technology level c, is given by:
 @F (q (c; w) ;w)
@"
@q (c; w)
@w
  @F (q (c; w) ;w)
@w
= 0,
so that:
@q (c; w)
@w
=   @F (q (c; w) ;w)
@w

@F (q (c; w) ;w)
@"
< 0. (39)
as @F (q(c;w);w)
@"
< 0 and @F (q(c;w);w)
@w
> 0 are assumed.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider rst the case where the price cap p increases. On
one hand, at the margin, this increases the expected revenue to producers from the spot
market by 1 F ("^), the loss of load probability. On the other hand, this raises the market
capacity by @b"
@p
which in turn marginally reduces the loss of load probability and thereby
reduces payments to producers below the technology cuto¤ by (p  c) f ("^) @b"
@p
. We now
show that the latter e¤ect exactly o¤sets the former e¤ect, so that the combined impact
on any plant with marginal cost below an initial technology cuto¤ c0 is zero.
It follows from (10) that
@b"
@c
=
k00 (c)
f ("^)
(40)
and we know from (12) that @c
@p
=  k
0(c)
(p c)k00(c) , so we can write the latter e¤ect as:
(p  c) f ("^) @b"
@p
= (p  c) f ("^) @c
@p
@b"
@c
= (p  c) f ("^)  k
0 (c)
(p  c) k00 (c)
k00 (c)
f ("^)
=  k0 (c) = 1  F ("^) ,
where the last equality uses (10). This shows that the two e¤ects are exactly o¤setting.
The argument is similar for the case where the capacity payment z increases. On one
hand, at the margin, the capacity payment to production below the technology cuto¤ c0
increases by 1. On the other hand, expected revenues to producers in the spot market
decrease by (p  c) f ("^) @b"
@z
. We again can show that the latter e¤ect exactly o¤sets the
former e¤ect. This here follows directly from (12) and (40).
(p  c) f ("^) @b"
@z
= (p  c) f ("^) @c
@z
@b"
@c
=
1
(p  c) k00 (c)
k00 (c)
f ("^)
= 1: (41)
It follows that, in both cases, any extra revenue due to the higher price cap and/or
capacity payments goes solely to covering the production and investment costs of new
investments above the initial technology cuto¤ c0.
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Proof of Proposition 8. Again using (18), conventional supply at the optimal technol-
ogy cuto¤ c can be written as q (c; w) = F 1 (1 + k0 (c) ; w). Di¤erentiating the condition
for the socially-optimal technology cuto¤ c from (19) shows that the impact of w on c
satises:
dc
dw
k0 (c) (p   c) k00 (c) dc
dw
 k0 (c) dc
dw
 @
2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^2
@q (c; w)
@w
 @
2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^@w
= 0.
This can be rearranged to give:
dc
dw
=  
@2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^2
@q(c;w)
@w
+ @
2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^@w
(p   c) k00 (c)  0; (42)
which is positive given the maintained assumptions k00 (c) > 0 and @
2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^2
 0, the
renewables assumption @
2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^@w
 0 as well as @q(c;w)
@w
< 0 which holds because (39)
holds for all c. Again using (18), the socially-optimal loss of loss probability satises
LOLP = 1  F ("^; w) =  k0 (c) and so di¤erentiation yields:
dLOLP
dw
=  dk
0 (c)
dw
=  k00 (c) dc
dw
 0.
Finally, for the special case with M("^; w)  0, it follows by inspection that dc
dw
= 0 and
so also dLOLP
dw
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 9. The overall impact of renewables on the socially-optimal
conventional capacity is given by:
dq (c; w)
dw
=
@q (c; w)
@c
dc
dw
+
@q (c; w)
@w
: (43)
We derive the rst term by di¤erentiating the optimality condition (18) to obtain:
 @F (q (c; w) ; w)
@"
@q (c; w)
@c
=  k00 (c) =) @q (c; w)
@c
= k00 (c)

@F (q (c; w) ; w)
@"
> 0:
(44)
We have already derived the second term dc
dw
in (42) and the third term @q(c;w)
@w
in (39) so
using these gives:
dq (c; w)
dw
=
@2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^2
@F (q(c;w);w)
@w
@F (q(c;w);w)
@"
  @2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^@w
@F (q(c;w);w)
@"
(p   c)
 
@F (q(c;w);w)
@w
@F (q(c;w);w)
@"
=   1
@F (q(c;w);w)
@"
(p   c)
 
@2M ("^; w)
@"^@w
+
@F (q (c; w) ;w)
@w
"
(p   c) 
@2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^2
@F (q(c;w);w)
@"
#!
 0;
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which holds if and only if
h
(p   c)  @2M("^;w)
@"^2
.
@F ("^;w)
@"
i
@F ("^;w)
@w
  @2M("^;w)
@"^@w
, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 10. The family (p; z) of socially-optimal policies is dened by the
condition in (20) so, for a xed p, we have:
@z (w; p)
@w
+
@2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^2
@q (c; w)
@w
+
@2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^@w
+ (p   p) k00 (c) dc
dw
= 0,
and so:
@z (w; p)
@w
=  @
2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^2
@q (c; w)
@w
  @
2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^@w
  (p   p) k00 (c) dc
dw
.
Using the term for dc
dw
from (42) we obtain:
@z (w; p)
@w
=  @
2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^2
@q (c; w)
@w
  @
2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^@w
+ (p   p)
@2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^2
@q(c;w)
@w
+ @
2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^@w
(p   c)
=  

p  c
p   c

@2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^2
@q (c; w)
@w
+
@2M (q (c; w) ; w)
@"^@w

 0,
given the assumptions @
2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^2
 0 and @2M(q(c;w);w)
@"^@w
 0 together with @q(c;w)
@w
< 0
from (39). Finally, for the special case with M("^; w)  0, it follows by inspection that
@z(w;p)
@w
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 11. Under the design laid out in Section 6.1., the non-reserve
market is independent from the reserve market. Hence, revenues for plants in the energy-
only market are identical to those in a competitive market with the same price cap p
and no capacity payment.21 Hence, the invested capacity b", technology cuto¤ c and
technology mix will also be the same. When solving for investments into the reserve, we
can take investments into the non-reserve market as given. We know from Proposition 7
that even if a capacity payment z was introduced, this would not change the technology
mix and supply below the marginal cost c. It follows that revenues for reserve plant are
identical to those for plant in the capacity range [b";b"r] of a US-style capacity market
with a uniform capacity payment z. Hence, the technology mix for that range and the
technology cuto¤ cr follow from our results for US-style capacity markets. Therefore, in
21Recall that p0 is the lowest VOLL level for which we can ensure positive socially optimal in-
vestments. Hence, c (p0) and q (c (p

0)) are the technology cuto¤ and market capacity, respectively,
for that lowest VOLL level. It follows from Proposition 2 that those investments will also occur for
p = p0 +M
0 (q (c (p0))) =k
0 (c (p0)) when z = 0. We need p > p

0 +M
0 (q (c (p0))) =k
0 (c (p0)) to make sure
that investments are non-negative.
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sum, statements (i)-(iv) follow from Proposition 2. Finally, we verify using comparative
statics the statement (v) that the payment di¤erence p   pr (which energy-only plant
make relative to reserve plant, in situations when the strategic reserve is used) is equal
in expectation to the capacity payment z to reserve plant. By the arguments of (41),
a marginally higher capacity payment to reserve plant would lower their spot-market
revenues by (p  c) f ("^) @b"
@z
= 1, so that expected prot remains zero. The spot price
for energy-only plants does not change when the capacity payment z to reserve plants
increases. Hence, the payment di¤erence p pr will, in expectation, give an extra payment
to non-reserve plant, relative to reserve plant, which will increase at the same rate as z
increases.
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